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I. Introduction
There are four primary justifications for penological decisions: retribution,
incarceration, deterrence, and rehabilitation.1 Any sentence lacking legitimate
penological justification is disproportionate to the offense,2 and violates the
Eighth Amendment.3 The United States Supreme Court has held that lack of
maturity, vulnerability to negative influences, and less defined character diminish
the justification for imposing the harshest penalties on juveniles.4

* Candidate for J.D., 2018, University of Wyoming College of Law. I would like to thank
my wife Amy, for her support and encouragement during the writing of this case note: once again,
I ruined Christmas. I cannot thank Professor Darrell Jackson enough, for his enthusiasm about this
project, his guidance, and for exciting me about the practice of criminal law. I must also offer my
deepest thanks to the Editorial Board of the Wyoming Law Review for the opportunity to write this
case note, and all their hard work in helping bring it to life, particularly Mikole Bede Soto, Emily
Elliot, and Paige Hammer. I would also like to thank my friends Christyne Martens and Dave
Delicath, for introducing me to this story, and encouraging me to play my own part in it.
1

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71–76 (2010).

2

Id. at 71.

3

See U.S. Const. amend. VIII.

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 – 65 (2012); see infra notes 74– 88 and
accompanying text. The Court has used the adjective “diminished” to describe the culpability of
4
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Rehabilitation was the primary focus of the juvenile justice system at the turn
of the twentieth century, not punishment.5 Consequently, judges predominantly
decided cases based on what they believed to be the best interest of the child.6
Popular thought believed that committing criminal activities was a symptom of
a child’s “real needs,” and the offense usually had little to do with the child’s
disposition.7 The shift away from these earlier beliefs of rehabilitation to
criminalizing juveniles in the adult system has had particularly devastating effects
on juveniles.8
Over the last decade, the United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
on juvenile sentencing has rejected punitive goals in favor of the possibility of
rehabilitation.9 First, the Supreme Court categorically prohibited the death penalty
for juveniles.10 Next, the Supreme Court categorically prohibited life without
parole sentences for juveniles who commit non-homicide offenses.11 Finally, in
Miller v. Alabama the Supreme Court prohibited mandatory life without parole
sentences for juveniles regardless of the crime.12 In 2016, Montgomery v. Louisiana
allowed the retroactive application of the Miller decision,13 which grants inmates
sentenced to life without parole as juveniles a “meaningful opportunity” to
demonstrate they are ready to return to society.14
Wyoming finds itself at the forefront of the next great question in juvenile
sentencing reform: determining the role of Miller in aggregate sentencing.15 Wyatt
Bear Cloud was sixteen years old when he and another juvenile, Dharminder Vir
Sen, broke into the home of an elderly couple in Sheridan, Wyoming.16 During
the course of the robbery, Sen shot and killed one of the homeowners.17 Bear
juveniles, acknowledging some culpability for the crimes committed while justifying the juvenile
offender’s unique position under the Eighth Amendment. See also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48,
69 (2010).
Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems’ Response to Youth Violence, 24 Crime &
Just. 189, 192 (1998).
5

6

See Id. at 193.

7

Id.

8

See Graham, 560 U.S. at 74.

9

See infra notes 44 –106 and accompanying text.

10

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005); see infra notes 44–56 and accompanying text.

11

Graham, 560 U.S. at 74; see infra notes 57–73 and accompanying text.

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012); see infra notes 74–88 and accompanying text.
12

13

Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732 (2016).

14

Id. at 736–37 (2016); see infra notes 90–106 and accompanying text.

Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, ¶ 32, 334 P.3d 132, 141 (Wyo. 2014); see infra notes
147–172 and accompanying text.
15

16

Bear Cloud v. State, 2012 WY 16, ¶ 4, 275 P.3d 377, 383 (Wyo. 2012).

17

Id., 275 P.3d at 383.
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Cloud appealed his life in prison sentence to the United States Supreme Court.18
The Supreme Court remanded for resentencing in accordance with Miller.19 Two
appeals later, Bear Cloud confronted the Wyoming Supreme Court with the
question of whether aggregate sentences added up to de facto life without parole.20
In Bear Cloud III the Wyoming Supreme Court held consecutive sentences
could aggregate into a de facto life without parole sentence that violated Miller
v. Alabama.21 The Wyoming Supreme Court correctly applied United States
Supreme Court precedent in extending Miller to aggregate sentences which create
de facto life sentences for juveniles in violation of the Eighth Amendment.22
In the Background section, this Note discusses the evolution of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence.23 Next it considers the shifting penological
justifications for juvenile sentencing in Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida,
and Miller v. Alabama.24 Third, it examines Montgomery v. Louisiana’s retroactive
application of Miller.25 The Principal Case, Bear Cloud v. State (Bear Cloud
III ), examines the Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision that lengthy aggregate
sentences are de facto life without parole sentences for juveniles that violated
Miller.26 This Note argues that the Wyoming Supreme Court correctly applied
Miller’s prohibition of mandatory life without parole sentences to juveniles given
aggregate sentences that were de facto life without parole.27 This argument is
supported by the United States Supreme Court’s explanation of Miller in their
2016 decision, Montgomery v. Louisiana.28 Now that de facto life without parole
sentences are unconstitutional, a clear definition of de facto must be put in place.29
Finally, the focus of juvenile justice must shift toward rehabilitation and eventual
release, and the continued assurance of Miller’s substantive guarantee.30

18

Bear Cloud v. State, 2013 WY 18, ¶ 12, 294 P.3d 36, 40 (Wyo. 2013).

19

Id., 294 P.3d at 40.

Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, ¶ 12, 334 P.3d 132, 137 (Wyo 2014); See infra notes
113 –172 and accompanying text. De facto is defined by Black’s as “[a]ctual; existing in fact; having
effect even though not formally or legally recognized. De facto, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed.
2014), Westlaw 2017.
20

21

Bear Cloud, ¶ 33, 334 P.3d at 141– 42.

22

See infra notes 175–254 and accompanying text.

23

See infra notes 31– 40 and accompanying text.

24

See infra notes 41– 89 and accompanying text.

25

See infra notes 90 –112 and accompanying text.

26

See infra notes 113 –174 and accompanying text.

27

See infra notes 175–185 and accompanying text.

28

See infra notes 186 –216 and accompanying text.

29

See infra notes 217–254 and accompanying text.

30

See infra notes 255–282 and accompanying text.
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II. Background
A. The Eighth Amendment: Proportionality
The Eighth Amendment states, “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”31 The
Amendment’s protections are shaped around the idea that punishment should
be proportional to the crime.32 Proportionality analysis considers evidence of
changes in society, gathered by surveying federal and state law, and the justices
own judgment to determine whether a punishment is so disproportionate to the
crime that it becomes cruel and unusual.33
Proportionality analysis found a modern voice in Thompson v. Oklahoma.34
In Thompson, the United States Supreme Court held that evolving standards
of decency did not allow a juvenile under sixteen-years-old to be sentenced to
death.35 In the next year, Stanford v. Kentucky cited the evolving standards and the
Court upheld the death penalty for juveniles over fifteen but under eighteen.36 On
the same day, the Court also held the Eighth Amendment did not categorically
exempt mentally disabled convicts from being sentenced to death.37
However, over a decade later, the Atkins v. Virginia Court noted that standards
of decency had evolved, and held the Eighth Amendment prohibited the
execution of mentally disabled offenders.38 The decision relied on the under
standing that diminished culpability made deterrence less effective, and made
it less defensible to punish in pursuit of retribution.39 As the concept of diminished culpability took shape, it fundamentally changed juvenile sentencing.40

31

U.S. Const. amend. VIII.

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002); see also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 367 (1910).
32

33
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 – 61 (2005). The Court has continually used
“the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” to describe its
analysis of what constitutes “cruel and unusual.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 –101 (1958)
(plurality opinion).
34

See Roper, 543 U.S. at 561 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 818–838 (1988)).

35

Id.

36

Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370–1 (1989).

37

Roper, 543 U.S. at 563 (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)).

38

See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002).

39

Roper, 543 U.S. at 563 – 64 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318–20).

40

See infra notes 44 –56 and accompanying text.
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B. Shifting Penological Justifications
Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama represent a shift
in the United States Supreme Court’s conception of juvenile justice.41 In these
cases, the Court held that because of their diminished culpability, the most severe
punishments, death and life without parole, were unconstitutional for juveniles.42
After years of treating juveniles in the criminal justice system as if they were adults,
the Court acknowledged that immaturity not only caused juveniles to make bad
decisions, it also changed the way they should be punishment.43
Diminished culpability was the rationale for the Court’s 2005 decision in
Roper v. Simmons, where the Court held the Eighth Amendment forbids imposition
of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of eighteen at the
time the offender committed the crime.44 Surveying state statutes and sentencing
practices, the Court found that death sentences were rarely imposed on juveniles,
and states were trending toward abolishing the sentence for juveniles.45 The Court
held that juveniles were less culpable for three reasons.46 First, juveniles have an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility and lack of maturity.47 Second, juveniles
are more vulnerable and susceptible to negative influences.48 Lastly, a juvenile’s
character is not as well-formed as an adult’s.49
The social purposes of the death penalty—retribution and deterrence—
are less effective because of these differences in how juveniles conceptualize
punishment.50 While the Court never exculpates the juveniles of all responsibility,
it is inherently diminished by immaturity; juveniles are less blameworthy, and

41

See infra notes 44 – 88 and accompanying text.

42

See infra notes 44 – 88 and accompanying text.

43

Roper, 543 U.S. at 571; see infra notes 44–88 and accompanying text.

Id. at 578. Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer. Justice Scalia dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Thomas. Justice
O’Connor dissented separately. Id. at 551.
44

Id. at 564, 567. The Court noted that while trends in sentencing had generally been
trending toward harsher sentences for juveniles, no state since the Court’s decision in Stanford
v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) had reinstated a death penalty for juveniles, while several had
prohibited it, and a majority of the states and the federal government prohibited death sentences for
juveniles. Id. at 564– 68.
45

46

Id. at 569 –70; see infra notes 47–52 and accompanying text.

47

Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.

48

Id.

49

Id. at 570.

Id. at 571. For a discussion of the social purposes of the death penalty, see Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, Stevens, JJ)).
50
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less deserving of society’s retribution.51 Likewise, the threat of punishment only
deters someone who weighs the consequences of his or her actions.52
In implementing a categorical ban on sentencing juveniles to death, the Roper
Court explicitly rejected a case-by-case analysis.53 The Court’s decision hinged
on the inherent difficulty in determining whether or not a juvenile is irreparably
corrupt.54 Psychologists, for example, cannot diagnose an individual under
eighteen with antisocial personality disorder.55 The Court concluded that jurors
should not be asked to make determinations of irreparable corruption when
highly trained doctors are prohibited from making those judgments until patients
have reached maturity.56
In 2010, the Supreme Court again considered the diminished culpability of
juveniles in Graham v. Florida.57 Seventeen-year-old Graham was found guilty
of armed burglary and attempted robbery while on probation, as such he was
sentenced to life imprisonment.58 The Graham Court held that the Eighth
Amendment also prohibited sentencing a juvenile to life in prison without parole
for a non-homicide crime, requiring that states provide an opportunity—not a
guarantee—to obtain release before the end of the term.59
After determining that Graham’s categorical challenge to his sentence was
appropriate, the Court analyzed it under the Roper framework: survey legislative

51

Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.

52

Id. at 571–72.

Id. at 573. The Court concluded that “an unacceptable likelihood exist[ed] that the
brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments
based on youth . . . even where the juvenile offender’s objective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack
of true depravity should require a sentence less severe than death.” Id.
53

54

Id.

Id. (citing Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Stat. Manual of Mental Disorders,
701–706 (4th ed. 2000). (“This pattern has also been referred to as psychopathy, sociopathy, or
dissocial personality disorder.” Id. at 702.).
55

56
Roper, 543 U.S. at 573 (citing Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Stat. Manual
Mental Disorders, 701– 706 (4th ed. 2000) (“By definition, Antisocial Personality Disorder
cannot be diagnosed before age 18 years.” Id. at 704.).

of

57

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010).

Id. at 57. Florida abolished parole in 1983, for any crime committed after October 1 of
that year. Absent executive clemency, Graham’s life imprisonment sentence meant he would have
spent his life in prison. Release Types, Florida Commission on Offender Rev., https://www.fcor.
state.fl.us/release-types.shtml. (Last vistited Feb. 5, 2017).
58

Graham, 560 U.S. at 82. Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court, joined by Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Chief Justice Roberts concurred in the judgment. Justices Scalia,
Thomas and Alito dissented. Id. at 48.
59
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enactments, and apply their independent judgment.60 First, the Court noted that
standards of decency had evolved.61 In 2010, the year of Graham’s arguments,
thirty-seven states and the federal government allowed judges to sentence juvenile
non-homicide offenders to life without parole.62 However, a survey of actual
sentencing practices in the country showed courts rarely used the sentence.63
The Court viewed this as persuasive evidence that the practice was disfavored
by society.64
The Court applied its independent judgment through the lens of the Roper
factors of lessened juvenile culpability: immaturity and undeveloped sense of
responsibility; vulnerability to negative outside influences and peer pressure; and
undeveloped character.65 These three factors influenced Graham as much as they
influenced the juvenile in Roper.66 If Graham had diminished culpability because
of his age, the Court determined he should be even less culpable than an adult
non-homicide offender, and less deserving of the harshest punishments.67
To a juvenile, a sentence of life without parole “means a denial of hope . . . .”68
Such punishment is especially harsh on a juvenile, who will likely serve more
years and a greater percentage of their life in prison than a similarly sentenced
adult.69 This disproportionate effect could violate the Eighth Amendment on its
own.70 Severe punishment is less likely to deter a juvenile because a juvenile is less
likely to consider possible punishment prior to acting.71 Retribution must directly

60
Id. at 59– 65. Graham’s appeal challenged the constitutionality of his sentence, not for its
length, but for its categorical effect, a type of challenge previously considered only in death penalty
cases. The Court began the opinion evaluating whether Roper or the analysis set forth in Harmelin
v. Michigan was appropriate. Under Harmelin, a term-of-years sentence is challenged by comparing
the gravity of the offense to the sentence imposed. If this analysis suggests disproportionality, the
sentence is then compared to similar sentences for the same crime in that jurisdiction. Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991) (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
61

Graham, 560 U.S. at 62–5.

62

Id. at 62.

63

Id. at 62–5.

64

Id. at 67.

65

Id. at 67– 8; see supra notes 46– 49 and accompanying text.

66

See Id. at 68.

Id. at 68–9. See Kennedy v. Louisiana 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (discussing distinction between
homicide and non-homicide offenders.).
67

Id. at 70. (quoting Naovarath v. State, 105 Nev. 525, 526, 779 P.2d 944 (1989) (“it means
that good behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it means that whatever the future
might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the convict] he will remain in prison for the rest of
his days.”).
68

69

Graham, 560 U.S. at 71.

70

See Id.

71

Id. at 72.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2017

7

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 17 [2017], No. 2, Art. 6

350

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 17

relate to the offender’s personal culpability, and that culpability is diminished by
youth enough to preclude the harshest punishment unless a juvenile is irreparably
corrupt.72 The Court held that determinations of irreparable corruption could
not be made at the outset, but without that determination, there was no adequate
penological justification for life without parole sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, and the Eighth Amendment forbids such sentences.73
Following the decisions in Roper and Graham, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to two cases that argued mandatory life without parole sentences
for juveniles were unconstitutional.74 In the first case consolidated in Miller v.
Alabama, Kuntrell Jackson, fourteen, was convicted of felony murder after the
fatal shooting of a clerk during an attempted robbery of a video store.75 In the
second case, Evan Miller, also fourteen, was convicted of murder in the course
of arson after beating a drug dealer with a bat, and setting fire to his trailer to
disguise the beating, which resulted in the dealer’s death.76 Both Arkansas and
Alabama law required sentences of life without parole.77
In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that mandatory life
with
out parole sentences constitute cruel and unusual punishment for
juveniles.78 Miller reiterated Graham and Roper’s rationale that “children are
constitutionally different from adults for the purposes of sentencing.”79 There is
“too great a risk of disproportionate punishment” if youth cannot be considered
during sentencing.80
Much of the Miller Court’s analysis focused on Graham, where a juvenile’s
immaturity and vulnerability to peer pressure diminished their culpability
and made them less deserving of the harshest sentences.81 The Miller Court
acknowledged the distinction Graham made between homicide and nonhomicide crimes, but drilled further, to the root of the reasoning: juveniles are

72

Id. at 71–3.

Id. at 72–4. Considering Graham’s “escalating pattern of criminal conduct,” the trial judge
determined Graham was incorrigible, but the Court disagreed: “even if Graham had shown during
his time in prison that he was in fact, incorrigible, ‘the sentence was still disproportionate because
the judgment was made at the outset.’” Id. at 73.
73

74

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2461– 63 (2012).

75

Id. at 2461.

76

Id. at 2462– 63.

77

Id. at 2461– 63.

78

Id. at 2460.

79

Id. at 2464.

80

Id. at 2469.

81

Id. at 2463 – 69.
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different.82 Miller requires sentencing schemes to consider age and a juvenile’s
diminished culpability.83
The inflexibility of a mandatory sentencing structure does not allow
consideration of age.84 Mandatory sentences also fail to take into account family
and home situations, and the circumstances of the crime itself.85 Juveniles will
also likely serve more years in prison for a life sentence than an adult with a
comparable sentence.86 The Court left open the possibility that a juvenile could
be sentenced to life without parole, but warned that appropriate occasions
would be uncommon.87 To make the determination that a juvenile should be
sentenced to life without parole, a judge is required to account for the differences
between juveniles and adults outlined in Roper, Graham, and Miller itself.88 For
four years, the meaning and reach of Miller would be argued across the country
until the Supreme Court issued their first substantive explanation of the case in
Montgomery v. Louisiana.89

C. Diminished Culpability Applied: Montgomery v. Louisiana
In 1963, Henry Montgomery killed a deputy sheriff in Louisiana, at the age
of seventeen.90 He was serving a life without parole sentence when the Supreme
Court handed down the Miller decision.91 Montgomery sought collateral review
of his sentence under Miller, and after Louisiana rejected his claim, he appealed
to the United States Supreme Court.92 In Montgomery v. Louisiana, the United
States Supreme Court considered whether Miller had set forth a rule that required
retroactive application.93 The Montgomery Court applied the analysis of Teague
v. Lane and held that Miller was a substantive rule of constitutional law, which
therefore required the retroactive application of the rule.94

82
Id. at 2465. “Most fundamentally, Graham insists that youth matters in determining the
appropriateness of a lifetime of incarceration without the possibility of parole.” Id.
83

Id. at 2466.

84

Id. at 2468– 69.

85

Id. at 2468.

86

Id. at 2466.

87

Id. at 2469.

88

Id.

89

See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 727 (2016).

90

Id. at 725.

91

Id. at 726.

92

Id. at 726 –27.

93

Id. at 727.

94

Id. at 732.
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Under Teague, substantive rules of constitutional law and “watershed rules
of criminal procedure,” which implicate the fundamental fairness and accuracy
of criminal proceedings, are retroactively applicable.95 The Montgomery Court
concluded that Miller was a new substantive rule of constitutional law, and
the Constitution requires state courts to give retroactive effect on collateral
review.96 In examining the substantive nature of Miller, the Court did not waste
the opportunity to offer guidance on what the decision meant, and how to apply
the decision.97
The State of Louisiana argued Miller was a procedural holding, not
implicating Teague, because it did not place punishment beyond the State’s
power to impose.98 Rather, Louisiana argued Miller only required consideration
of youth in the sentencing.99 The Court explained the line drawn in Miller was
between crimes of transient immaturity and irreparable corruption, where a life
without parole sentence was appropriate only in the latter instance.100 Louisiana
also contested the distinction because the holding in Miller did not require a
finding of fact, only a hearing during which the juvenile’s age must be considered
as part of the sentencing determination.101 The Montgomery Court found these
arguments unpersuasive.102 According to the Montgomery Court, the substantive
holding in Miller is that “life without parole is an excessive sentence for children
whose crimes reflect transient immaturity.”103
The Court also addressed permissible ways to implement Miller’s
retroactivity.104 States could avoid re-litigating sentences by extending parole
eligibility to juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole.105 Parole boards

95

Id. at 729–30. (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989)).

96

Id. at 729.

97

Id. at 732–37; See infra notes 98–112 and accompanying text.

98

Id. at 734.

99

Id.

Id. “The only difference between Roper and Graham on the one hand, and Miller on the
other hand, is that Miller drew a line between children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity
and those rare children whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption. The fact that life without parole
could be a proportionate sentence for the latter kind of juvenile offender does not mean that all
other children imprisoned under a disproportionate sentence have not suffered the deprivation of a
substantive right.” Id.
100

101

Id. at 734.

102

Id. at 734 –36.

103

Id. at 735.

104

Id. at 736.

Id. (discussing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(c) (2016) (“a person sentenced to life
imprisonment for an offense committed before the person reached the age of eighteen (18) years
shall be eligible for parole after commutation of his sentence to a term of years or after having served
twenty-five (25) years of incarceration . . . .”)).
105
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would then have the task of determining which offenders had matured (whose
crimes reflected transient immaturity) from those who were irreparably corrupt,
and deserving of life in prison.106
The United States Supreme Court has stressed how difficult it is to determine
irreparable corruption.107 The only way immaturity can be taken out of the analysis
is by allowing the juvenile to mature.108 The time it takes for juveniles to mature
means Miller should be read as a categorical bar on initially sentencing a juvenile
to life without parole.109 Roper, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery fundamentally
establish the proposition that youth matters during sentencing, and only juveniles
whose crimes are representative of irreparable corruption can be subjected to the
most severe penalties.110 The Court has yet to address the specific requirements for
the timing and nature of a Miller hearing.111 It will be the rare juvenile who will
spend their life in prison, but the question of how rare juvenile life without parole
sentences will be now lies with the states.112

III. Principal Case
On August 26, 2009, Wyatt Bear Cloud, along with Dharminder Vir Sen and
Dennis Poitra Jr., broke into the home of Robert and Linda Ernst in Sheridan,
Wyoming.113 During the burglary, Sen shot and killed Mr. Ernst.114 Bear Cloud
was sixteen at the time and Sen was just fifteen.115
Bear Cloud was charged with Murder in the First Degree (Felony Murder)
(Count I), Conspiracy to Commit Aggravated Burglary (Count II), and
Aggravated Burglary (Count III), to which he pled not guilty.116 After denying
Bear Cloud’s motion to transfer the case to a juvenile court, and a change of plea,
Bear Cloud was sentenced to twenty to twenty-five years on Count III, life in

106

Id.

107

See id. at 734; see supra notes 44 – 49, 53–56, 65–73, 81–83, and accompanying text.

108

Id.

109

See supra notes 90 –106 and accompanying text.

110

See supra notes 44 –106 and accompanying text.

111

See supra notes 74 –88 and accompanying text.

Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 733–34. “Miller made clear that “appropriate occasions” for
sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.” Id.
112

113

Bear Cloud v. State, 2012 WY 16, ¶ 4, 275 P.3d 377, 383 (Wyo. 2012).

114

Id. ¶ 8, 275 P.3d at 384.

Id. ¶ 4, 275 P.3d at 383. Dennis Poitra, the third member of the trio, was eighteen years
old at the time of the crime. Id. ¶ 4, 275 P.3d at 383. As such, Dennis Poitra is beyond the scope of
this comment.
115

116

Id. ¶ 9, 275 P.3d at 384.
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prison with the possibility of parole117 for Count I to be served consecutively to
the sentence for Count III, and twenty to twenty-five years for Count II, served
concurrent to Count I.118
In Bear Cloud v. State (Bear Cloud I ), the Wyoming Supreme Court held
that a juvenile’s life sentence for felony murder was constitutional under both the
United States Constitution and Wyoming Constitution.119 Bear Cloud argued for
an extension of Graham to felony murder, and alternatively, all life sentences for
juveniles.120 However, the Wyoming Supreme Court refused to extend Graham
because Bear Cloud was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole.121 The
court viewed Graham’s holding as limited to a sentence of life without parole.122
The Wyoming Supreme Court also refused to hold Wyoming’s mandatory
sentencing scheme, which required the imposition of a life sentence for juveniles
charged as adults with felony murder, as unconstitutional.123 Although Wyoming’s
sentencing scheme did not provide the opportunity to consider the offender’s
age, culpability, life history or potential to reform, as relied upon in Roper and
Graham, the mandatory sentence was not per se unconstitutional.124 Further, Bear
Cloud’s age was considered as part of the motion to transfer to juvenile court.125
Bear Cloud filed an application for writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court in 2012.126 In June 2012, Miller v. Alabama was decided, which
prohibited mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles.127 Following
Miller v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment and
remanded Bear Cloud I to the Wyoming Supreme Court.128
On remand in Bear Cloud II, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that
Wyoming’s sentence of life imprisonment according to the law as applied to
juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment and remanded the case to the district

Id. ¶ 15 n. 1, 275 P.3d at 384 n.1. (explaining the sentence is known in Wyoming as “life
imprisonment according to law.” The Bear Cloud I court used this phrase interchangeably with “life
with the possibility of parole.”).
117

118

Id. ¶ 15, 275 P.3d at 384 n. 1.

119

Id. ¶ 87, 275 P.3d at 413.

120

Id. ¶ 48, 275 P.3d at 397.

121

Id. ¶ 51, 275 P.3d at 399.

122

Id. ¶¶ 48–52, 275 P.3d at 397–99.

123

Id. ¶ 81, 275 P.3d at 411.

124

Id. ¶ 83, 275 P.3d at 411.

125

Id., 275 P.3d at 411.

126

Bear Cloud v. State, 2013 WY 18, ¶ 12, 294 P.3d 36, 40 (Wyo. 2013).

127

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).

128

Bear Cloud v. Wyoming, 133. S. Ct. 183, 183 (2012).
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court for resentencing on the first degree murder conviction.129 First, the
court concluded that reliance on executive clemency to provide a meaningful
opportunity for release was inconsistent with Graham v. Florida.130 The Wyoming
Statute provides for “two possible sentences for a juvenile convicted of first-degree
murder: life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or life imprisonment
‘according to the law.’”131 Parole was statutorily unavailable to anyone sentenced
to “life imprisonment without parole or a life sentence.”132 Only the possibility
of executive clemency differentiated the two sentences.133 Due to the limitations
of the statute, the court concluded Wyoming’s sentencing and parole scheme had
the “practical effect” of mandating life without parole under both sentences and,
when applied to juveniles, violated the Eighth Amendment under Miller.134
The court also offered guidance to district courts sentencing juveniles under
Miller.135 Wyoming district courts “must consider the factors of youth and the
nature of the homicide at an individualized sentencing hearing when determining
whether to sentence the juvenile offender to life without the possibility of parole or
life according to law.”136 The court also listed the factors Miller recommended to
trial courts, and stressed that considering these factors at a hearing on a motion to
transfer to juvenile court was insufficient protection under Miller.137 The sentence
of life imprisonment according to the law would be the appropriate sentence for
juveniles whom the court determined should have the possibility of parole, and
every juvenile so sentenced must be afforded the opportunity for “true parole” at
some point.138 The parole board must also “provide a meaningful determination
and review when parole eligibility arises.”139
Following the guidance set forth in Bear Cloud II, the district court
resentenced Bear Cloud to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after
twenty-five years.140 The life sentence with possibility of parole was to be served
consecutively with Bear Cloud’s sentence of twenty to twenty-five years for

129

Bear Cloud, ¶ 49, 294 P.3d 36, 48.

130

Id. ¶ ¶19–20, 294 P.3d at 41–2.

131

Id. ¶ 31, 294 P.3d at 44 (quoting Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101(b) (2009)).

132

Id. ¶ 32, 294 P.3d at 44– 45 (quoting Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-402(a) (2009)).

133

Id. ¶ ¶ 32–33, 294 P.3d at 45 (quoting Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(c) (2009)).

134

Id. ¶ 34, 294 P.3d at 45.

135

Id. ¶ 35, 294 P.3d at 45.

136

Id. ¶ 45, 294 P.3d at 47.

137

Id. ¶¶ 42–43, 294 P.3d at 47 (discussing Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467– 68 (2012)).

138

Id. ¶ 46, 294 P.3d at 47.

139

Id. ¶ 47, 294 P.3d at 48.

140

Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, ¶ 11, 334 P.3d 132, 136 (Wyo. 2014).
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aggravated burglary.141 Thus, Bear Cloud would serve a total of forty-five years
before he was eligible for parole, at the age of sixty-one.142
Not long after Bear Cloud II was decided, Dharminder Vir Sen’s appeal
went before the Wyoming Supreme Court.143 Like his co-conspirator, Sen was
convicted of First Degree felony murder, conspiracy to commit aggravated
burglary, and aggravated burglary.144 The court upheld Sen’s conviction, but in
light of Miller and Bear Cloud II, the court vacated the entire sentence.145 The
court was concerned that Sen’s life without parole sentence might have influenced
the term-of-years sentences for the other counts.146
Bear Cloud appealed again and argued that the court should have reconsidered
all three of his sentences as was the case in Sen.147 In Bear Cloud III, the Wyoming
Supreme Court considered whether all of Bear Cloud’s sentences should have
been vacated upon remand in Bear Cloud II, and whether Bear Cloud’s sentence
created a de facto life without parole sentence which did not comply with Miller
v. Alabama.148 The court analyzed these claims under the Eighth Amendment of
the United States Constitution.149
Writing for the Wyoming Supreme Court, Justice Kate Fox began by
acknowledging that under Miller juveniles were constitutionally different than
adults for sentencing purposes.150 She recognized that following Graham’s
reasoning, any life without parole sentence for juveniles implicated the differences
between juveniles and adults.151 Following the holding in Sen, the court first held
that it erred in remanding Bear Cloud II for resentencing only on Bear Cloud’s
first-degree murder conviction.152 When the United States Supreme Court vacated
the judgment in Bear Cloud I “it wiped the slate clean.”153

141

Id., 334 P.3d at 136.

142

Id., 334 P.3d at 136.

143

Sen v. State, 2013 WY 47, 301 P.3d 106 (Wyo. 2013).

144

Id. ¶ 8, 301 P.3d at 112.

145

Id. ¶ 1, 301 P.3d at 110.

146

Id. ¶ 1, 301 P.3d at 110.

147

Bear Cloud, ¶¶ 30–31, 334 P.3d at 141.

148

Id. ¶ 12, 334 P.3d at 137.

Id. ¶ 14, 334 P.3d at 137. An argument was raised under the Wyoming Constitution but
was quickly dismissed by the court as “no more than a passing reference to the protections that
might be afforded by our state constitution.” See, ¶ 14 n. 4, 334 P.3d at 137 n 4.
149

150

Id. ¶ 15, 334 P.3d at 137.

151

Id. ¶ 22, 334 P.3d at 139.

152

Id. ¶ 31, 334 P.3d at 141.

153

Id. ¶ 31, 334 P.3d at 141.
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The Wyoming Supreme Court then considered whether the practical effect
of lengthy aggregate sentences violated the Eighth Amendment for juveniles, as
set forth in Roper, Graham, and Miller.154 The court interpreted the underlying
principle of these cases to require the protection of Miller when aggregate
sentences result in the functional equivalent of life without parole.155 Justice
Fox explained that allowing lengthy aggregate sentences, which effectively put a
juvenile in prison for life, was exactly what Miller held to be unconstitutional.156
In the wake of Miller, courts across the United States confronted aggregate
sentencing of juveniles.157 The Wyoming Supreme Court found several courts’
decisions to be persuasive, in their logic, if not their results.158 Courts in Indiana
and Iowa agreed with Wyoming that aggregate sentences could result in de facto
life sentences.159 The Indiana Supreme Court chose to “focus on the forest—the
aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of
counts, or length of sentence on any individual count.”160 State v. Null, decided
by the Iowa Supreme Court in 2013, was particularly persuasive to the Wyoming
Supreme Court.161 In Null, Iowa considered whether a juvenile sentenced to a
52.5-year minimum prison term triggered the protections of Miller.162 The court
held that “geriatric release” did not provide a “meaningful opportunity” to reenter
society as required in Graham and Miller, but held under the Iowa Constitution
such a sentence was cruel and unusual.163 A juvenile “should not be worse off ”
receiving a lengthy aggregate sentence than one sentenced to life without parole
after receiving a Miller hearing.164 The court noted that while Miller did not bar
life sentences for juveniles, a process must be followed when imposing a sentence
of life without parole.165
What that process entailed, and what evidence might be considered remained
nebulous.166 The Wyoming Supreme Court rejected the use of life expectancy and
154

Id. ¶ 33, 334 P.3d at 141– 42.

155

Id. ¶ 33, 334 P.3d at 141–142.

156

Id. ¶ 33, 334 P.3d at 142.

157

See infra notes 159 –164; 234–239 and accompanying text.

158

Bear Cloud, ¶¶ 33 –35, 334 P.3d at 142– 43.

159

Id. ¶ 33, 334 P.3d at 142.

Id. ¶ 33, 334 P.3d at 142 (quoting Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 8 (Ind. 2014) (holding a 150year sentence under this framework unconstitutional, but an 80-year sentence to be constitutional)).
160

161

Bear Cloud, ¶ X, 334 P.3d at 142 (discussing State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 2013)).

162

Id. ¶ 34, 334 P.3d at 142 (quoting State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 71 (Iowa 2013)).

163

Id. ¶ 34, 334 P.3d at 142 (quoting State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 70–75 (Iowa 2013)).

164

Id. ¶ 34, 334 P.3d at 142 (quoting State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 72 (Iowa 2013)).

165

Id. ¶ 43, 334 P.3d at 145.

See id. ¶ 36 –37, 334 P.3d at 143 – 44 (holding that Miller must be applied “to the entire
sentencing package, when the sentence is life without parole, or when aggregate sentences result in
the functional equivalent of life without parole.”).
166
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actuarial data to make projections as to what Bear Cloud’s life expectancy might
be in relation to his sentence, though it did note that the United States Sentencing
Commission equated a sentence of 470 months to a life sentence.167 The court did
not signal approval for this term-of-years to be used as a standard.168 A survey of
other jurisdictions revealed no clear consensus in federal and state courts whether
Miller and Graham applied to lengthy or aggregate sentences, or how courts
should make that determination.169 Wyoming established the concept of de facto
life without parole, but the court did not set out a clear standard to determine
whether a sentence was a de facto life without parole sentence.170 Rather than
implement a concrete standard to identify a de facto sentence, or list factors to be
weighed or balanced, the court simply stated that “[d]istrict court[s] should weigh
the entire sentencing package” and “must consider the practical result of lengthy
consecutive sentences” in light of Miller.171
On remand, the district court resentenced Bear Cloud to life with the
possibility of parole after twenty-five years, five to ten years for aggravated
burglary and twenty to twenty-five years for conspiracy to commit aggravated
burglary running concurrently with his life sentence.172 Wyatt Bear Cloud will
be eligible for parole after serving twenty-five years.173 In March of 2017, in Sen’s
third appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court, the court declined to overrule Bear
Cloud III ’s conclusion that Miller applies to aggregate sentences.174

IV. Analysis
A. Bear Cloud III: De Facto Life Without Parole Violates the
Eighth Amendment
In Bear Cloud III, the Wyoming Supreme Court correctly applied Miller v.
Alabama’s prohibition of mandatory life without parole sentences to juveniles

167
Id. ¶ 34, 334 P.3d at 142; see U.S. Sentencing Commission Preliminary Quarterly
Data Report, 8 (through March 31, 2014) http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/researchand-publications/federal-sentencing-statistics/quarterly-sentencing-updates/USSC-2014-QuarterReport-2nd.pdf. (470 months is 39.17 years.).
168

Bear Cloud, ¶ 34, 334 P.3d at 142.

169

Id. ¶¶ 33–35, 334 P.3d at 142– 43; see infra notes 234–239 and accompanying text.

170

Id. ¶¶ 36 –37, 334 P.3d at 143–44.

171

Id. ¶ 36, 334 P.3d at 143– 44.

Offender Locator, Wyoming Department of Corrections, http://wdoc-loc.wyo.gov/
Home/Detail/?id=29819&dbType=WCIS. (last visited April 28, 2017, 1:05 PM)
172

Id. The decision to run the sentences concurrently, rather than consecutively, eliminated
twenty to twenty-five years from Bear Cloud’s aggregate sentence. He will be approximately fortyone when he is eligible for parole, excluding application of good time.
173

Sen v. State, 2017 WY 30, ¶ 18 n. 3, 390 P.3d 769, 775 n. 3. (Wyo. 2017); see infra notes
245–249 and accompanying text.
174
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sentenced to aggregate sentences that were de facto life without parole.175 The
Miller Court argued that “[m]ost fundamentally, Graham insists that youth
matters in determining the appropriateness of a lifetime of incarceration . . . .”176
To the Wyoming Supreme Court, the differences between juveniles and adults
“implicate[d] any life-without-parole sentence imposed on a juvenile,” whether
it was one count or multiple counts.177 The court refused “to ignore the reality”
of the consequences lengthy aggregate sentences would have on juveniles.178
Miller prohibited mandatory situations where a juvenile would spend their life in
prison.179 Aggregate sentences could violate the Eighth Amendment as surely as a
single sentence.180
The Wyoming Supreme Court saw Miller as a procedural protection, noting
that it was not a categorical bar, but a requirement for consideration of the
unique differences between juveniles and adults.181 The result of the court’s
application of Miller, however, was substantive.182 In holding that Miller’s process
must be applied to the entirety of a juvenile’s sentencing package, district courts
were instructed as to when Miller must be considered, not how.183 Bear Cloud III ’s
precedent, that a forty-five year sentence implicated a de facto life without parole
sentence placed the Wyoming Supreme Court at the forefront of protecting
the Eighth Amendment rights of juveniles.184 Two years later, the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana would read Miller in much
the same way as the Wyoming Supreme Court did in Bear Cloud III, making
much of the earlier decision’s reasoning appear prophetic.185

175

See Bear Cloud, ¶ 33, 334 P.3d 132, 141–42.

176

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012).

177

Bear Cloud, ¶¶ 22–34, 334 P.3d at 139– 42.

178

Id. ¶ 33, 334 P.3d at 142.

179

Id. ¶ 33, 334 P.3d at 142.

180

Id. ¶ 33, 334 P.3d at 142.

181

Id. ¶ 27, 334 P.3d at 141.

182

See supra notes 95–103 and accompanying text.

183

Bear Cloud, ¶ 36, 334 P.3d at 143.

184

See supra notes 147–172 and accompanying text.

Compare Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016) (“The only difference
between Roper and Graham on one hand, and Miller, on the other hand, is that Miller drew a
line between children whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption. The fact that life without
parole could be a proportionate sentence for the latter kind of juvenile offender does not mean
that all other children imprisoned under a disproportionate sentence have not suffered the
deprivation of a substantive right.”), and Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 733–34 (“Miller made
clear that ‘appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to the harshest possible penalty will be
uncommon.’”), with Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, ¶ 22, 334 P.3d 132, 139 (“the reasoning
in Graham ‘implicates any life without parole sentence imposed on a juvenile. . .’”), and Bear Cloud,
¶ 37, 334 P.3d at 144 (“appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to the harshest possible
penalty will be uncommon.”).
185
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B. Miller Reconsidered: Montgomery v. Louisiana’s Implied
Categorical Bar
The Montgomery Court concluded Miller was a substantive holding,
requiring retroactive application.186 The Montgomery Court favored an expansive
reading of the Miller decision, similar to the Wyoming Supreme Court’s
interpretation in Bear Cloud III.187 Miller’s true holding was that “sentencing a
child to life without parole is excessive for all but the ‘rare juvenile offender whose
crime reflects irreparable corruption.’”188 Bear Cloud III relied on this premise
two years earlier when it extended the Eight Amendment protections to aggregate
sentences.189 The Montgomery Court’s interpretation of Miller suggests Bear
Cloud III was in accord with Miller v. Alabama and the Eighth Amendment’s
protection of juveniles from cruel and unusual punishments.190
For courts seeking to apply Miller/Montgomery, there is ample substantive
guidance.191 The proportionality analysis employed in the Miller line of cases
determined that severe punishments were excessive for all but the rare, irreparably
corrupt, juvenile.192 It is the procedural component that state and lower federal
courts must now implement.193 The procedures require consideration of fairness
and timeliness.194 Fairness under Miller revolves around the determination of
irreparable corruption: who makes it, and when.195 The Supreme Court has
made it clear, the “when” of this decision is vital to securing a juvenile’s Eighth
Amendment rights.196 If a decision about whether a juvenile is irreparably corrupt

Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732 (2016). The practical effect of Bear
Cloud III also determined Miller to be a substantive holding. Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113,
¶¶ 32–33, 334 P.3d 132, 141– 42 (Wyo. 2014); see supra notes 154–171, 175–180 and accompa
nying text.
186

187
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 732–33. The holding in the Miller opinion is as follows: “We
therefore hold that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their
crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’” Miller v.
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012).
188

Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734 (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012)).

Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, ¶ 37, 334 P.3d 132, 144 (Wyo. 2014) “The United
States Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence requires that a process be followed before
we make a judgment that juvenile ‘offenders will never be fit to reenter society.’” (quoting Graham
v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010)).
189

See supra notes 90–112 and accompanying text; see infra notes 191–216 and accompanying text.
190

191

Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 732–37.

192

Id. at 734.

193

Id. at 735–37; see also Bear Cloud, ¶¶ 33–35, 334 P.3d at 142–43.

194

See infra notes 195–210 and accompanying text.

195

See supra notes 44 –56 and accompanying text.

196

See supra notes 68 –73; 98–111 and accompanying text.
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is made too soon immaturity may taint the reliability of that determination.197
The Miller Court thought that the harshest sentence, life without parole, would
be uncommon because of the “great difficulty” of separating the juvenile
whose crime reflected transient immaturity and the juvenile whose crime
reflected irreparable corruption.198 The difficulty in differentiating between
transient immaturity and irreparable corruption guided the Roper Court
toward a categorical ban on juvenile death sentences, rather than using a caseby-case analysis.199 Graham used the categorical framework as well.200 Miller ’s
prohibition on mandatory sentencing is categorical for the same reason, though
its implementation requires two parts.201 To fairly sentence under Miller the initial
determination that a juvenile has committed a crime evidencing either transient
immaturity or irreparable corruption, must be followed by a later determination
that irreparable corruption was the cause of the juvenile’s crime.202
Logically, a juvenile offender can only demonstrate their crime was a product
of immaturity by showing a court that they have matured.203 Procedures that do
not allow for a proper determination of corruption—those procedures that make
a determination before a juvenile has the opportunity to mature or rehabilitate—
would violate the Eighth Amendment under Miller.204 For the transiently
immature, life imprisonment is improper.205 The Montgomery Court suggested
parole hearings could serve as the forum for both retroactive consideration,
and future evaluations of irreparable corruption.206 Parole boards already have
a place in the justice system and gather information on inmates that would be
useful in helping to make determinations under Miller.207 At a parole hearing,
a determination that an offender sentenced as a juvenile has matured and made
efforts to rehabilitate themselves could serve as a basis for concluding their crime
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016) (“Allowing those offenders to be
considered for parole ensures that juveniles whose crimes reflected only transient immaturity—and
who have since matured—will not be forced to serve a disproportionate sentence in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.”).
197

198

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).

199

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005).

200

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 58– 62 (2010).

Montgomery 136 S. Ct. at 734 “To be sure, Miller ’s holding has a procedural component.
Miller requires a sentencer to consider a juvenile offender’s youth and attendant characteristics
before determining that life without parole is a proportionate sentence.”
201

202

Id.; See also notes 68–73; 78 –83; 100 –103 and accompanying text.

Maturity is an antonym of immaturity. Maturity, Merriam-Webster Thesaurus, https://
www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/maturity.
203

204
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735. “[L]ife without parole is an excessive sentence for children
whose crimes reflect transient immaturity.” Id.
205

Id.

206

Id. at 736.

207

Id.
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was a product of transient immaturity.208 Conversely, findings that an offender
sentenced as a juvenile has not rehabilitated themselves, and has given further
evidence during their incarceration that they are not deserving of release will
show an irreparable corruption that time has not diluted.209 As noted approvingly
in Montgomery, Wyoming statutorily implemented parole eligibility to provide
retroactivity under Miller.210
The United States Supreme Court has yet to consider whether aggregate
sentences implicate the protections of Miller v. Alabama.211 However, the
Montgomery Court’s substantive interpretation of Miller suggests a majority of the
Court would agree with the Wyoming Supreme Court that aggregate sentences
resulting in de facto life without parole sentences are unconstitutional under
Miller.212 If multiple sentences create the same effect as the single sentence in
Miller, the juvenile should not lose their meaningful opportunity to demonstrate
that they are not irreparably corrupt.213 With Montgomery, Miller, and Graham all
standing for the proposition that it will be the uncommon juvenile offender who
merits a life behind bars, a lengthy term-of-years sentence could be construed by
the Court as violating the principles of these cases.214 Going forward, challenges
to juvenile sentences should be made under the Miller framework, as explained in
Montgomery.215 Any aggregate sentence given to a juvenile in Wyoming exceeding
Bear Cloud’s invites an appeal for a violation of Miller.216

208

Id.

209

Id.

210

Id.

211

See Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, ¶ 29, 334 P.3d 132, 141 (Wyo. 2014).

See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734; Bear Cloud, ¶ 33, 334 P.3d at 141– 42. See also notes
44–106 147–173,175–185 and accompanying text.
212

213
See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016) (“Miller drew a line between children
whose crimes reflect transient immaturity and those rare children whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption.”).
214

See supra notes 57–106 and accompanying text.

Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. 718, 718 (2016). Six of the current justices of the United States
Supreme Court joined this opinion. Id. The Miller majority, Justice Kagan, with Justice Kennedy,
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, was joined in Montgomery by Chief Justice Roberts. Id. In
Graham, Chief Justice Roberts concurred separately: “Graham’s age places him in a significantly
different category from the defendan[t] in . . . Harmelin.” Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 91
(2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in judgment). Justice John Paul Stevens voted in the majority
in Graham before Justice Kagan replaced him later that year. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 48
(2010). Justice Kagan took her seat August 7, 2010. Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme
Court, Supreme Court of the United States, https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.
aspx (last visited February 3, 2017).
215

216

See supra notes 170 –173 and accompanying text.
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C. Why the De Facto Life Without Parole Standard Must be Clear
The Wyoming Supreme Court warned that when an aggregate sentence
became a de facto life without parole sentence, an offender is required to receive
a Miller hearing.217 The court did not set a threshold for district courts to assess
when an aggregate sentence begins to implicate Miller, only that the sentence
should not be “functionally equivalent” to life without parole.218 This situation is
unworkable for several reasons. First, without an objective standard that triggers
Miller, the analysis devolves into a case-by-case analysis, a process distinctly
rejected by the United States Supreme Court.219 Second, it could inadvertently
produce the same results the Wyoming Supreme Court sought to avoid, where
a juvenile with a lengthy aggregate sentence is left worse off than an offender
sentenced to life without parole after receiving a Miller sentencing hearing.220
Case-by-case analysis of juvenile sentencing has been rejected by the United
States Supreme Court since Roper v. Simmons.221 The categorical determination
under Miller/Graham/Roper that juveniles are different for the purposes of
sentencing is due to their characteristics.222 In Graham, the Court found that the
categorical challenge to a term-of-years sentence was unique, but warranted.223
While Miller may not have explicitly created a categorical bar to life without
parole, it can be inferred from Montgomery that determinations of irreparable
corruption cannot be made when an offender is a juvenile, and initial life without
parole sentences will be exceedingly uncommon.224 For Wyoming to implement
a case-by-case consideration of what a de facto life without parole sentence entails
contravenes the United States Supreme Court’s current Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence.225 Juveniles are a category unto themselves for sentencing and state
court decisions applying the Eighth Amendment in opposition to that precept
invite reversal.226

217

Bear Cloud, 2014 WY 113, ¶ 33, 334 P.3d at 141–2.

218

Id. ¶ 33, 334 P.3d at 142.

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572–74 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48,
59– 62, 74 –9 (2010); see also notes 53–56; 60 and accompanying text.
219

See infra notes 154–165 and accompanying text; see also State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 72
(Iowa 2013).
220

221
222

Roper, 543 U.S. at 572–74; see infra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010).

Id. Analysis under Harmelin v. Michigan—a comparison between the severity of the
penalty and the gravity of the crime—is inapplicable when a class of offenders is challenging the
sentencing for a multitude of crimes. Id. at 61–2; see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,
998–1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
223

224

Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734–36 (2016).
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See supra notes 221–224 and accompanying text.
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See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572–73 (2005); Graham, 560 U.S. at 77– 80.
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Wyoming’s current understanding of de facto life without parole is
nebulous.227 Without defining de facto life without parole, Wyoming runs the
risk that lengthy aggregate sentences will put a juvenile with multiple lesser
offenses in prison longer than the juvenile sentenced to life, who is statutorilyguaranteed parole eligibility after twenty-five years.228 For example, in Bear Cloud,
before burglarizing the Ernst home, the three attempted to enter another home
in the area.229 Aggravated burglary can carry a sentence up to twenty-five years.230
Hypothetically, if Bear Cloud had been charged with a count of aggravated
burglary for each home, he could have faced a fifty-year sentence.231 If Bear Cloud
had only been charged with murdering Mr. Ernst, under the current statutory
scheme he could be eligible for parole in twenty-five years.232 Such results violate
the fundamental “precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated
and proportioned to [the] offense” under Miller.233
The case law cited in Bear Cloud III agreed that de facto life without parole
existed, but varied widely in determining what sentences might qualify.234 In
Moore v. Biter, the Ninth Circuit considered a 254-year aggregate sentence, under
which the offender would not have been eligible for parole before he was 144
years old and held that his sentence violated Graham because “the trial judge
determined at the outset that Moore could not rehabilitate.”235 In State v. Null,
the Iowa Supreme Court held that fifty-two and one half years implicated a de
facto life without parole sentence, while rejecting objective standards of lifespan
to inform that decision.236 In Floyd v. State, the First District Court of Appeal of
Florida held that an eighty-year sentence was de facto life without parole, based on
life expectancy data suggesting Floyd would die in prison.237 In Thomas v. State,
the same court rejected the argument that a fifty-year sentence was de facto life
without parole.238 While the Wyoming Supreme Court found the arguments of

227

See infra notes 228–242 and accompanying text.

See supra notes 154 –165 and accompanying text; see also, State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 72
(Iowa 2013).
228

229

Bear Cloud v. State, 2012 WY 16, ¶ 5, 275 P.3d 377, 383 (Wyo. 2012).

230

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-301 (c) (2016).

231

Id.

232

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–3–301(c) (2016); Wyo. Stat. Ann. 6–10–301(c) (2016).

233

Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).

Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, ¶ 33–35, 334 P.3d 132, 143–43; see infra notes
235–240 and accompanying text.
234

235

Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184, 1186, 1194 (9th Cir. 2013).

236

State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 71 (Iowa 2013).

237

Floyd v. State, 87 So.3d 45, 47 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012).

238

Thomas v. State, 78 So.3d 644, 646 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).
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these courts persuasive, the court was much more faithful to the idea of giving
juveniles a meaningful opportunity for release.239
Wyoming’s de facto life without parole sentence is implicated by a shorter
term-of-years than any jurisdiction surveyed in Bear Cloud III.240 The Bear
Cloud III court rejected a forty-five-year year term before parole eligibility as a de
facto life sentence.241 Wyoming Statute § 6–10–301(c) now extends parole to
juveniles sentenced to life in prison after twenty-five years.242 The Wyoming
Supreme Court narrowed the window of guidance for de facto sentencing
under Bear Cloud III, when they decided the third appeal of Bear Cloud’s
co-conspirator, Dharminder Vir Sen.243
In Sen v State (Sen III ), the Wyoming Supreme Court held that Sen’s thirtyfive-year sentence was not a de facto life sentence, and did not violate the Eighth
Amendment.244 The court explained their decision in Bear Cloud III did not hold
every aggregate sentence over twenty-five years to be in violation of Miller.245 The
court also determined that eligibility for parole at age fifty did not indicate that
Sen lacked a meaningful opportunity for release.246 Thus, in Wyoming, a de facto
life sentence implicates Miller at some point between thirty-five years and fortyfive years, including aggregate sentences.247 The court noted that the statutory
requirement for parole eligibility after twenty-five years used the singular, “an
offense,” and was not controlling in aggregate sentences.248
Through case law, the Wyoming Supreme Court has begun to determine
a categorical benchmark of where a de facto life without parole sentence begins
under Bear Cloud III.249 The holding in Sen III narrows the range of sentences

Bear Cloud, ¶ 37, 334 P.3d at 144; see supra notes 171–173 and accompanying text. When
the standard in Miller requires a “meaningful opportunity,” it is hard to see eighty years, or even
fifty-two years as meaningful, compared to the parole eligibility Bear Cloud will have after twentyfive years in prison. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
239

240
Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, ¶¶ 33–35, 334 P.3d 132, 142– 43; see supra notes
171–173 and accompanying text.
241

Id. ¶¶ 11, 33, 334 P.3d 132, 136, 141– 42.

242

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(c) (2016).

243

Sen v. State, 2017 WY 30, ¶ 2, 390 P.3d 769, 771.

244

Id. ¶ 2, ¶ 25, 390 P.3d at 771, 777.

245

Id. ¶ 21, 390 P.3d at 775–76.

246

Id. ¶ 25, 390 P.3d at 777.

Compare Bear Cloud, ¶¶ 1, 11, 33, 334 P.3d at 135, 136, 141– 42 (holding forty-five
year sentence de facto life without parole) with Sen, ¶¶ 22, 25 (holding thirty-five years was not
the functional equivalent of life without parole sentence); see supra notes 147–172 and accompa
nying text.
247

248

Sen, ¶ 21, 390 P.3d at 775.

249

See supra notes 241–249 and accompanying text.
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that will implicate Bear Cloud III challenges to aggregate sentences between
thirty-five and forty-five years.250 This guidance will hopefully make it easier for
district courts across Wyoming to effectively sentence under Bear Cloud III.251
Given the Wyoming Supreme Court’s aversion to legislating from the bench, it
seems likely that challenges will be raised until the window is narrowed to an exact
point, or the sentences draw the attention, and intervention of the legislature.252
To leave Justice Fox’s prescient reading of Miller wallowing in case-bycase appeals, offering little finality to juvenile sentences in Wyoming, or
persuasive guidance to other courts, would waste an opportunity to transform
juvenile justice in the Equality State and beyond.253 In granting a meaningful
opportunity for release to many juveniles, the promise of Miller and Bear Cloud
III can only be kept by doing everything possible to make prison a meaningful
rehabilitative experience.254

D. Rehabilitation, and Demonstrating Transient Immaturity
In demanding that juvenile offenders who demonstrate their capacity to
change be provided with a meaningful opportunity to be released, the Miller line
of cases removed a major impediment to juvenile rehabilitation.255 Those serving
life without parole sentences suffer limited access to rehabilitative programs in
many prison systems and are sometimes completely ineligible.256 Post-secondary
education is effectively unavailable following the elimination of Pell Grant
eligibility for inmates.257 Grants for life skills training are only available to inmates
under thirty-five years of age, who are within seven years of release.258 Inmates
serving life without parole sentences usually have the lowest priority for accessing
vocational programs, GED classes, or even support groups.259

250

Sen, ¶ 2, ¶ 25, 390 P.3d at 771, 777.

251

See Brief for Appellee at 12–13, Sen v. State, 2017 WY 30, 390 P.3d 769 (Wyo. 2017).

See generally Bear Cloud v. State, 2012 WY 16, ¶ 85, 275 P.3d. 377, 412 (Wyo. 2012)
(declining to serve “as a ‘super legislature’ to rewrite the laws of [Wyoming] under the guise of
constitutional mandate.”).
252

253

See supra notes 221–226 and accompanying text.

254

See infra notes 277–283 and accompanying text.

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48,
74 (2010) (“Life without parole forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal.”)).
255

256
Brief for The Sentencing Project as Amicus Curiae, at 10 –13, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621).
257
Brief for The Sentencing Project as Amicus Curiae, at 11, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48
(2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621); see 20 U.S.C. § 1070a(b)(7) (2012).
258
Brief for The Sentencing Project as Amicus Curiae, at 11, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48
(2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621).

Brief for The Sentencing Project as Amicus Curiae, at 12, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48
(2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621).
259
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Now, even juveniles sentenced for the most severe crimes will have better
access to programs when those programs are based on severity of the sentence.260
Under Miller, juveniles will not enter prison sentenced to life without parole,
and will therefore be eligible for rehabilitative programs, even under current
prison regulations.261 Educational opportunities during incarceration reduce
recidivism and improve job prospects upon release.262 Without improvements
to the rehabilitative aspects of juvenile incarceration, the opportunity for release
guaranteed by Miller will be less meaningful and less successful for both the
offenders and society.263
In addition to assuring that juvenile offenders have meaningful opportunities
to rehabilitate while incarcerated, a juvenile offender’s opportunities for release
equally depend on establishing procedures that will accurately implement
Miller.264 To assure these opportunities are meaningful, the necessary delay
between sentencing and the determination of irreparable corruption suggest two
possible paths to implementation.265 The United States Supreme Court has already
approved of allowing parole boards to serve this function.266 Parole eligibility easily
remedies the retroactive application of Miller, but prospectively, jurisdictions face
choices in establishing procedures to properly sentence under Miller.267 States
might allow all Miller determinations of transient immaturity to be administered
by the parole board.268 States could also require that all Miller-eligible juvenile
offenders receive a sentencing hearing before a judge to re-evaluate their maturity

260

See supra notes 256 –259 and accompanying text.

See Brief for The Sentencing Project as Amicus Curiae, at 11–13, Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621); see supra notes 186–216 and accompanying text (arguing
that Miller categorically bans initially sentencing a juvenile to life without parole).
261

262
Reducing Recidivism and Improving Other Outcomes for Young Adults in the Juvenile and
Adult Criminal Justice Systems, Justice Center, The Council of State Governments, 1, 4 (2015),
https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Transitional-Age-Brief.pdf.
263
Reducing Recidivism and Improving Other Outcomes for Young Adults in the Juvenile and
Adult Criminal Justice Systems, Justice Center, The Council of State Governments, 1, 4 (2015),
https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Transitional-Age-Brief.pdf. (quoting
Matthew R. Durose et al., Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 30 States in 2005: Patterns from 2005
to 2010, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics (2014).
“Recidivism rates for young adults released from prison are significantly higher than for other age
groups. One study found that approximately 76 percent of people who were under the age of 25
when released from prison were rearrested within three years, and 84 percent were rearrested within
five years.”).
264

See infra notes 266 –280 and accompanying text.

265

See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734–36 (2016).

266

Id. at 736.

267

Id.

268

See id.
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after a set period of time.269 What must not vary between jurisdictions is the
fairness of any procedure by which the transiently immature may distinguish
themselves from the irreparably corrupt.270
The United States Supreme Court showed a preference for retroactive
implementation of Miller via parole eligibility.271 This eliminates the burden of
re-litigating thousands of sentences that might be implicated under Miller.272
Since the Court has shown support for the parole process, parole eligibility criteria
would be a starting point for jurisdictions establishing their own procedural
framework for prospective application of Miller.273
In Wyoming, parole eligibility rests on several factors, most notably having
served the appropriate portion of the sentence and not having engaged in specific
violent acts while incarcerated.274 Commutation reports in Wyoming present
information to the parole board regarding an inmate’s offense and sentence,
criminal history, personal history, psychological and psychiatric evaluations, and
institutional history.275 The effectiveness of these indicia to determine whether a
juvenile offender deserves an opportunity for release under Miller will have to be
evaluated over time.276 The Montgomery Court briefly discussed submissions it
received from Montgomery in his petition, detailing his efforts to create a prison
boxing team, and his employment in the prison silk-screening shop.277 To what
extent information like Montgomery’s submissions to the Court, testimony,
and other evidence is allowed, and what procedures are to be followed must be
debated and studied.278 Courts must evaluate the effectiveness of such criteria in

Id. at 736. (Re-litigation of sentences was neither required, nor proscribed. The Court’s
preference for parole eligibility as a retroactive solution may stem from its connection to the penal
system, and its function as the typical avenue of release following incarceration.)
269

Id. at 735 (explaining “The hearing does not replace but rather gives effect to Miller’s
substantive holding that life without parole is an excessive sentence for children whose crimes reflect
transient immaturity.”). Miller’s procedural component only requires that some type of hearing
consider that question. Id.
270

271

Id. at 736.

272

Id.

273

Id.

Wyoming Board of Parole, Policy and Procedure Manual, Wyoming Board of Parole, 35–37
(2017), https://sites.google.com/a/wyo.gov/bop/about-us/board-policies.
274

275

Id. at 33.

276

Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 718 (2016).

277

Id. at 736.

See generally New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may,
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country.”)
278
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successfully identifying juveniles whose crimes reflected transient immaturity over
time to assure meaningful compliance with the Court’s decision.279
Second, it will be decades before the justice system can evaluate whether
juveniles sentenced after Miller received the benefit of its substantive guarantee.280
Life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders will become truly uncommon,
or the necessity for greater procedural safeguards will become apparent.281
Monitoring the parole decisions of inmates eligible under Miller will offer
necessary additional data that legislatures need to consider if these decisions are
going to actually change juvenile sentencing in the United States, or simply shift
the location, from courtroom to parole hearing, where we give up on rehabilitating
juvenile offenders.282

V. Conclusion
The Eighth Amendment is violated when a juvenile whose crime is rooted
in transient immaturity is sentenced to life without parole.283 Bear Cloud III
correctly held that aggregate sentences can create de facto life without parole
sentences that are cruel and unusual punishment for juveniles.284 Miller v.
Alabama procedurally requires the court to consider the diminished culpability of
juveniles for sentencing purposes, and substantively holds that only those whose
crimes reflect irreparable corruption receive a sentence of life without parole.285
The Miller line of cases further stands for the proposition that irreparable
corruption cannot be determined until a juvenile has the opportunity to
mature.286 The initial sentencing of a juvenile to life without parole is
unconstitutional.287 The nebulous standard in Bear Cloud III does not provide

See generally Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734. If the established criteria do not effectively
make this determination, the consequences are severe for society and the juvenile offender. Those
who were transiently immature who are not released have been denied their constitutional rights,
those who were irreparably corrupt who are released are a danger to society.
279

280
See supra note 157–172 and accompanying text. For example, absent good time, it will be
approximately twenty years before Wyatt Bear Cloud is eligible for parole.
281
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 733–34 (“Miller made clear that ‘appropriate occasions for
sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.’”).
282

Id. at 736.

283

Id. at 734.

Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, ¶ 33, 334 P.3d 132, 141– 42 (Wyo. 2014); see supra
notes 147–175, and accompanying text.
284

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012); see supra notes 41–89 and accompanying text.
285

286

Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 726, 734; see supra notes 90 –112 and accompanying text.

287

See supra notes 186 –216 and accompanying text.
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the guidance district courts need to effectively sentence, though the recent
decision in Sen III is a first step toward the necessary clarity.288 Case-by-case
consideration of juvenile sentencing has been expressly rejected by the United
States Supreme Court; to assure the accurate and timely protection of a juvenile’s
rights under Miller a clear standard must be provided.289 Finally, the focus of
prison for juveniles must shift from retribution to rehabilitation, or juvenile
offenders will return to society unprepared and destined to be separate, almost
as if they had remained incarcerated.290 The promises of Miller and Bear Cloud
III must be kept; should justice fail the transiently immature, society’s culpability
cannot be diminished.291

288
Sen v. State, 2017 WY 30, ¶¶ 21–25, 390 P.3d 769, 775–77; see supra notes 217–254 and
accompanying text.
289

See supra notes 217–254 and accompanying text.

290

See supra notes 255–282 and accompanying text.

Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016). “The opportunity for release
will be afforded to those who demonstrate the truth of Miller’s central intuition—that children
who commit even the most heinous crimes are capable of change.” Id. The question we must ask
ourselves, is are we capable of that change as well?
291
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